

## Message Text

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00187 01 OF 02 141821Z  
ACTION ACDA-02

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PA-01 INR-01 ACDE-00 /005 W  
-----141841Z 075130 /42

O R 141719Z APR 77 ZFF-4  
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2081  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
INFO USMISSION NATO  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0187

USIS FOR IPS/PE FOR LAFE ALLAN; IEU FOR KORDEK (FOR DEPT OF  
STATE BULLETIN)

E.O. 11652: N/A  
TAGS: PARM, NATO  
SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: END OF ROUND XI PRESS STATEMENT GIVEN  
BY NETHERLANDS AMBASSADOR DE VOS APRIL 15, 1977

REF: MBFR VIENNA 0186

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT FOR APRIL 14 WIRELESS FILE  
"EMBARGO UNTIL 1300 GMT APRIL 15". PRESS STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR  
WILLIAM DE VOS:

PRESS BRIEFING BY AMBASSADOR  
W. DE VOS VAN STEENWIJK  
ON BEHALF OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS  
IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

DURING THE PAST ROUND, WE HAVE DEALT BOTH WITH A NUMBER OF  
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00187 01 OF 02 141821Z

GENERAL TOPICS AND WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN  
EASTERN AND WESTERN FIGURES ON WARSAW PACT MILITARY MANPOWER.

ONE OF THE GENERAL TOPICS WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAVE  
CONCENTRATED ON DURING THE ROUND IS THE NEED FOR THE EAST TO  
MOVE AWAY FROM ITS BASIC CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS,  
NAMELY, THAT ALL ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS

MUST SUBMIT TO AN IDENTICAL REDUCTION FORMULA, AS THOUGH THEY WERE IDENTICAL IN ALL RELEVANT RESPECTS: THAT IS, IDENTICAL IN MILITARY IMPORTANCE, IDENTICAL IN THEIR GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION AND IDENTICALLY AFFECTED BY THE CONSEQUENCES OF REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THEIR FORCES.

OBVIOUSLY, THIS APPROACH IS NOT A LOGICAL OR REALISTIC ONE IF ONE LOOKS AT THE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES WHICH ACTUALLY EXIST AMONG THE DIFFERENT PARTICIPANTS. BECAUSE OF THESE DIFFERENCES, THE EAST'S INSISTENCE THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE TREATED IDENTICALLY WOULD RESULT IN GROSS INEQUITIES AND DIMINISH WESTERN SECURITY.

WHAT ARE THESE DIFFERENCES? THEY ARE, FIRST OF ALL, THE ENORMOUS DIFFERENCES IN THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF PARTICIPANTS. THE PARTICIPANTS IN THESE TALKS INCLUDE THE WORLD'S LARGEST MILITARY POWERS, THE US AND USSR, AS WELL AS COUNTRIES WITH MUCH LESS MILITARY POTENTIAL. BOTH THE US AND USSR POSSESS A LARGE AND VARIED STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. NONE OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS POSSESSES ANYTHING REMOTELY COMPARABLE. CLEARLY IT IS NOT REALISTIC TO EXPECT PARTICIPANTS TO OVERLOOK THIS BASIC FACT OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

SECOND, THERE ARE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT PARTICIPANTS AS TO GEOGRAPHICAL SITUATION. THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH IS THE LARGEST POWER ON THE EASTERN SIDE, IS SITUATED IN DIRECT PROXIMITY TO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THE US, ON THE OTHER HAND, WHICH IS THE COMPARABLE WESTERN POWER, IS LOCATED AT A DISTANCE OF 5,000 KILOMETERS ON THE OTHER SIDE

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00187 01 OF 02 141821Z

OF THE ATLANTIC OCEAN.

ANOTHER IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE IS THAT SOME OF THE PARTICIPANTS HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY ALL THEIR FORCES IN THE AREA. SUBSTANTIALLY ALL OF THEIR FORCES WILL THEREFORE BE AFFECTED UNDER ANY LIMITATION. BUT OTHER PARTICIPANTS HAVE ONLY A PORTION OF THEIR FORCES IN THE AREA AND IT IS ONLY THIS PORTION OF THEIR FORCES THAT WOULD IN ANY WAY BE LIMITED UNDER AN AGREEMENT.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US BOTH FALL IN THIS SECOND CATEGORY, OF COURSE. BUT IN THE CASE OF THE SOVIET UNION, WE ARE TALKING ABOUT THE PRESENCE, ON TERRITORY DIRECTLY ADJACENT TO THE REDUCTIONS AREA, OF EXTREMELY LARGE FORCES WITH AN IMPOSING ARRAY OF THE MOST MODERN EQUIPMENT.

FINALLY, THERE IS THE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST WITH REGARD TO THE OVERALL NUMERICAL LEVELS OF THEIR FORCES IN THE AREA. THE EAST POSSESSES SIZEABLE NUMERICAL ADVANTAGES IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND IN OVERALL MILITARY

MANPOWER IN THE AREA. IT ALSO HAS SUPERIORITY IN NUMBERS OF MOST TYPES OF MAJOR ARMAMENTS.

THESE ARE IMPORTANT REALITIES WHICH DEFINE THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION WE ARE ADDRESSING IN THESE TALKS. HOWEVER, THE EAST CONTINUES TO PRESS AN APPROACH WHICH DELIBERATELY DISREGARDS THESE REALITIES. IN DEFIANCE OF THE FACTS, IT HAS INSISTED THAT THE REDUCTION FORMULA SHOULD BE IDENTICAL FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS.

THE EAST CONTINUES TO ENVISAGE EQUAL PERCENTAGE ACROSS THE BOARD REDUCTIONS OF ALL TYPES OF MILITARY PERSONNEL AND ARMAMENTS WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH IN TREATY FORM A RIGHT FOR THE EAST TO MAINTAIN ITS CONSIDERABLE ADVANTAGES IN MILITARY MANPOWER AND ARMAMENTS.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00187 02 OF 02 141837Z  
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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PA-01 INR-01 ACDE-00 /005 W  
-----141841Z 075398 /41

O R 141719Z APR 77 ZFF-4  
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2082  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
INFO USMISSION NATO  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR

UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0187

USIS FOR IPS/PE FOR LAFE ALLAN; IEU FOR KORDEK (FOR DEPT OF STATE BULLETIN)

THIS OUTCOME WOULD BE INEQUITABLE AND WOULD SERIOUSLY DIMINISH WESTERN SECURITY. MOREOVER, THE EAST'S CONTRACTUALIZED NUMERICAL ADVANTAGES INSIDE THE REDUCTION AREA WOULD BE ENHANCED BY THE EAST'S GEOGRAPHIC ADVANTAGES: INSIDE THE AREA, THE EAST WOULD HAVE MORE MANPOWER AND MORE ARMAMENTS THAN THE WEST. AND ADJOINING THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, IS THE SOVIET UNION, ONE OF THE MOST POWERFUL COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD. SOVIET FORCES IN THE USSR ARE FAR LARGER THAN WESTERN FORCES IN THE

REDUCTION AREA AND WOULD BE SUBJECT TO NO NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS UNDER AN AGREEMENT.

WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD IN ADDITION HAVE TO ACCEPT NATIONAL CEILINGS. THIS WOULD SERIOUSLY HAMPER THE OPERATION OF NATO'S INTEGRATED DEFENSE STRUCTURE AND COULD PREJUDICE THE FUTURE ORGANIZATION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENSE. NATIONAL CEILINGS COULD LIMIT THE WESTERN ABILITY TO MAINTAIN THE OVERALL NUMBER OF THEIR MILITARY MANPOWER AT AN AGREED LEVEL.  
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00187 02 OF 02 141837Z

IT IS EVIDENT THAT THIS EASTERN APPROACH WOULD DIMINISH WESTERN SECURITY.

WE ARE DETERMINED TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO BRING ABOUT AN AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THE EAST WILL HAVE TO REALIZE THAT ANY AGREEMENT MUST BE BASED ON THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION AND NOT ON AN ARTIFICIAL APPROACH WHICH INSISTS ON TREATING ALL ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AS THOUGH THEY WERE IDENTICAL.

IN ITS PROPOSALS OF DECEMBER 1975, THE WEST MADE SIGNIFICANT ADDITIONS TO THE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS IT HAS PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED. THESE PROPOSALS OFFERED A REASONABLE AND EQUITABLE BASIS FOR AGREEMENT BASED ON APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES, INCLUDING A COLLECTIVE COMMON CEILING ON BOTH GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND OVERALL MILITARY MANPOWER. WE STILL CONSIDER THAT THEY DESERVE A POSITIVE AND SERIOUS EASTERN RESPONSE.

HOWEVER, SO FAR THE EAST HAS GIVEN US NO SUCH RESPONSE. IN ITS FEBRUARY 1976 PROPOSAL, WHICH IS NOT SUCH A RESPONSE, THE EAST CONTINUED TO INSIST ON THE SAME EQUAL PERCENTAGE APPROACH, WITH NO CHANGE IN THE OUTCOME WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM ITS IMPLEMENTATION. THE ONLY CHANGE WAS A CHANGE IN THE SEQUENCE OF REDUCTIONS.

A MAJOR TOPIC OF OUR DISCUSSIONS DURING THIS ROUND HAS BEEN THE DATA ISSUE.

LAST JUNE, TWO AND A HALF YEARS AFTER THE WEST TABLED DATA IN NOVEMBER 1973, THE EAST PUT DOWN FIGURES ON ITS FORCES IN THE AREA. THERE WAS A CONSIDERABLE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN FIGURES ON EASTERN FORCES IN THE AREA. OUR DISCUSSIONS DURING THIS ROUND HAVE SOUGHT TO CLARIFY THE  
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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00187 02 OF 02 141837Z

UNDERLYING REASONS FOR THIS DISCREPANCY. THESE DISCUSSIONS HAVE BEEN CARRIED ON IN A BUSINESS-LIKE WAY. HOWEVER, THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY HAVE NOT YET BEEN IDENTIFIED. THESE DISCUSSIONS WILL HAVE TO BE CONTINUED IN VIEW OF THE NEED FOR UNDERSTANDING ON FORCE LEVELS FOR SOLUTION OF THE SIZE OF THE REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY EACH SIDE AND FOR RESULTING LIMITATIONS.

TO SUM UP: WE ARE DISAPPOINTED THAT THERE HAS NOT BEEN MORE PROGRESS IN THE PAST ROUND. HOWEVER, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT A BASIS FOR PROGRESS EXISTS IF THE EAST MOVES TO A MORE REALISTIC APPROACH WHICH DOES TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE REAL AND IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES AMONG THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THE WESTERN APPROACH DOES THIS. RESOR

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